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ADJUDICATIVE JUSTICE IN
A DIVERSE MASS SOCIETY
Jack B. Weinstein*
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, associating with scores of law clerks and
thousands of students, lawyers, and judges, I have been amazed and
humbled in observing the altruistic devotion to human welfare that
exudes from the hearts of so many as they enter the legal profes-
sion. Our duty of public service, particularly to the less privileged,
is based on more than personal satisfaction. The protected status
and virtual monopoly of lawyers as actors within the adjudicatory
system comes with an implied promise to work for the public good.
In a larger sense, this obligation is founded upon the recogni-
tion that each of us stands on the shoulders of 10,000 generations.
While, of course, personal achievement should be recognized, it
was the fool of ancient times who is quoted in Deuteronomy as
saying that in his heart, "[m]y power and the might of my hand
hath gotten me this wealth."' What we have done, we have done
because of all that was done by others before us.
This Article2 addresses problems created by the disparity in
Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
Deuteronomy 8:17.
2 This Article is an expansion of the Orison S. Marden Lecture on Public
Service, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, held on January 13,
2000, which is reproduced in 55 RECORD 196 (2000); see also 6 WHO WAS
WHO IN AMERICA 263 (1996) (discussing Marden's public service). It is based
in part upon materials for seminars on "Equality" at Columbia Law School given
over the years with Judge John Dooling and Professors Arthur Murphy and Kent
Greenawalt, summarized in Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access
to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REv. 651 (1981). See also Jack B. Weinstein,
Delivery of Legal Services Reviewed, reprinted from N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1974
(evaluating the disparity between traditional notions of legal duty and the
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access to the courts and other adjudicative fora between the
privileged and less privileged.3 Enormous efforts have been made
by the legal profession to equalize opportunities to enforce
substantive rights.4 These efforts have fallen short of what we can
and should accomplish.
I. EQUALIZING THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
It may be argued that our adversary, adjudicative system should
take each case as presented and weigh it without regard to the
background of the litigants. A poor person, or one otherwise unable
to deal aggressively with the judicial system, should still receive
emerging necessity for legal services responsive to modem society).
3 The problem of the poor in accessing the courts referred to in this paper
remains with us as the gap between the richest and poorest grows despite our
booming economy. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilbom, Memphis Blacks Find Poverty's
Grip Strong, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1999, at A14; Jeff Madrick, How New is the
New Economy?, N.Y. REVIEW, Sept. 23, 1999, at 42. On the problems discussed
in this paper, see generally Proceedings of the Conference on the Delivery of
Legal Services to Low-Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1713-2791 (1999).
Those who have experience with the adjudication system will notice that
this subject is reviewed primarily from the viewpoint of a federal judge. If
looked at from the view of the state, the emphasis would be somewhat different.
See, e.g., Report to the Chief Judge of New York State, Funding Civil Legal
Services for the Poor by the Members of the Legal Services Project (May 1998)
(explaining that problems of the poor include shelter, particularly evictions;
income maintenance through food stamps; unemployment benefits; social security
and SSL and veterans benefits; consumer problems, such as debt collection and
wage garnishment; health issues; and family violence).
' The actual speech that was the basis of this Article was divided as follows:
I. A rationale for special treatment of the poor to equalize adjudication; II.
Models: A. Entrepreneurial-fees and profits to lawyers; B. Pro
Bono-subvention by individual lawyers and by legal aid types of lawyers
working for less than they might otherwise earn; C. Mass Actions-actions in
which the poor are treated in the same way as the well-to-do through devices
such as matrixes; D. Administrative protections--OSHA and payments to
claimants as in Social Security disability; E. Judicial Balancing-actions, such
as by leaning in favor of the disadvantaged to equalize sentencing; and I.




equal adjudicatory justice-i.e., an equal opportunity to prevail.
Given the inequalities embraced by our free enterprise, market-
place society, however, what happens in the courtrooms in the way
of inequality is largely a reflection of what happens in the outside
world.5 In essence, the world must equalize, and only then will the
courts follow.6 This argument is a powerful one, and I, like so
many others, am drawn to it. We lose patience with the person that
we think is acting incompetently or against his or her own best
interest. "Stop it. Why don't you act more like me," we think, but
are too polite to say.
The answer, I suggest, is that we cannot ignore the effects of
our work and institution. We cannot ignore the reality that by not
taking account of inequalities in capacity, we are in fact operating
a system of adjudication that is unequal and that is seen as unequal
by those who suffer from its inequalities. Observing the adjudica-
tion system in that light, it is difficult to justify the reality that our
democratic society tolerates the perpetuation of inequalities in
adjudication.
' See, e.g., Victor G. Savikos & David L. Silverman, Making the Poverty
Objection: Parties without Fancy Exhibits Could Claim Unfair Prejudice, but Not
All Judges Would Agree, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 1999, at C1; see also Nina
Bernstein, Widest Income Gap Is Found In New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2000, at B5; Richard W. Stevenson, In a Time of Plenty, the Poor Are Still Poor,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at 3. The problems of the poor have not been
substantially reduced by the huge growth of prosperity for the upper classes in
recent years. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Bold Effort Leaves Much Unchanged for
the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1999, at 1. But see Terry Carter, Mr. Democra-
cy, Giving More Billions to Further Justice Than Anyone Ever, A.B.A. J., Jan.
2000, at 57 (discussing the recent contribution of George Soros).
6 It has been said that, following Aristotle, there are four kinds of justice:
distributive (basic and just sharing of society's goods); corrective (recreation of
just distribution where there has been an unbalancing); retributive (punishment
and other reactions by government to "criminal" harm of one person by another);
and commutative (correcting inequalities that result from private exchanges). See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 80-81 (1996)
(stating that "[o]ur reliance on sporting metaphors... provides a clue to what
we regard as important" in "justice" and "fair procedure"). Transactional costs
would, even in the best of Aristotelian worlds, make it impossible to fully
vindicate substantive rights in adjudication. At the least, some inertia of the
system properly limits perpetual litigation.
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The thesis of this Article is rooted in Learned Hand's com-
mand, "Thou shalt not ration justice,"7 and the Bible's, nor shall
"you distinguish between the rich and poor, or prevent the justice
due to your poor in his suit."' Despite these injunctions, we often
lack the resources to provide everyone with the highest level of
adjudicatory justice available to the richest and most powerful in
our stratified society.9 All adjudicatory justice, as we know it,
arguably cannot be equal in practical effect without reducing its
level to all, which is an unacceptable solution. Even if that is so,
the basic question still remains: how can the gap between the ideal
and the real of equal adjudicatory justice be reduced?
What is the irreducible minimum standard of justice? First, the
process must be appropriately designed to assure that each person's
substantive rights are reasonably vindicated. Second, in each case
there must be substantial assurance that the process has worked to
protect substantive rights. Third, unnecessary gaps in the equality
of adjudication between rich and poor must not be greater than
practicalities require. How to further define and enforce those
standards in varying circumstances presents a never-ending series
of difficulties. Nevertheless, the task of constantly seeking to
minimize or solve the shifting problems of equalizing adjudicative
justice must be assumed by us, the legal profession. Delivering
equal adjudicative justice is our sine qua non-the legal profes-
sion's reason for being.
The problem of inequality in the adjudication system is woven
into the warp and woof of our legal fabric and is revealed in a
7 Learned Hand, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice, 9 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 3,
at 5 (1951). Congress has for years attempted to ration justice by cutting funds
for the Legal Services Corporation in order to reduce the threat of private
litigation on behalf of the poor to special and governmental interests. See James
S. Toedtman, The Funding Picture, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 24, 1999, at A6
(explaining that the Legal Services Corp. was cut from .4 to .3 billion in fiscal
2000); see also David E. Rosenbaum, Congress Leaves Business Lobbies Almost
All Smiles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at Al (discussing, inter alia, the attacks
on lawyers' abilities to bring tort actions).
8 Exodus 23:6.
9 See, e.g., Committee on Criminal Justice Operations and Budget,
Determining a Defendant's Eligibility for Assigned Counsel Service, 54 RECORD
493 (1999).
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myriad of ways each day in our courts. An example is the question
of whether interlocutory appeals should be allowed. One court of
appeals denied interlocutory appeals, in certain cases, because it
found that "where litigants may have unequal economic resources,
the final judgment rule protects the judicial process and its
participants from the delay which can prove advantageous to a
well-financed litigant, and fatal to the less well endowed."10 Even
so mundane a matter as who pays for the initial mailing of notice
to a prospective class can involve the rich-poor issue. As Justice
Douglas remarked in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:
The class action is one of the few legal remedies the small
claimant has against those who command the status quo.
I would strengthen his hand with the view of creating a
system of law that dispenses justice to the lowly as well as
to those liberally endowed with power and wealth."
'0 Bryant v. Sylvester, 57 F.3d 308, 312 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995).
" 417 U.S. 156, 186 n.8 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas
wrote in a footnote to his dissent:
Judge Weinstein writing in the N.Y. Law Journal, May 2, 1972, p. 4,
col. 3, said:
Where, however, public authorities are remiss in performance of
this responsibility for reason of inadequate legal authority, excessive
workloads or simple indifference, class actions may provide a
necessary temporary measure until desirable corrections have occurred.
The existence of class action litigation may also play a substantial role
in bringing about more efficient administrative enforcement and in
inducing legislative action.
The matter touches on the issue of the credibility of our judicial
system. Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide
a forum for adjudication of disputes involving all our
citizens-including those deprived of human rights, consumers who
overpay for products because of antitrust violations and investors who
are victimized by insider trading or misleading information--or we are
not. There are those who will not ignore the irony of courts ready to
imprison a man who steals some goods in interstate commerce while
unwilling to grant a civil remedy against the corporation which had
benefitted, to the extent of many millions of dollars, from collusive,
illegal pricing of its goods to the public.
389
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Much of the opposition to effective class actions--despite their
occasional abuses-is based on the fact that they are a great
equalizer, enabling those of little political clout or financial means
to band together effectively against the most powerful.
As the millennium turns, this is an appropriate time for a legal
impact statement, somewhat like an environmental impact state-
ment. We could ask-despite many improvements by New York
State's great Chief Judge, Judith Kaye, and others-what courts
and administrative agencies are doing for, and to, the poor and the
lower middle classes. It would be an audit that would turn up
reasons both for dismay and for pride. Our pragmatic system adds
procedures and institutions on an "as-needed" basis. Perhaps this
is the time for a global review of how a more integrated American
equal adjudicative justice system should be structured without
tearing down the sound aspects of the present system.
A. Successes
There are many grounds for pride in our successes in opening
up the adjudication system to all. Among others, these include: (1)
encouraging competent attorneys to prosecute claims for the poor
through contingency fees payable only if there is a recovery;' 2 (2)
statutes encouraging Title VII discrimination suits by providing for
fee shifting from defendants found liable;13 (3) statutory counsel
"2 See Stephen L. Pepper, Access to What, 2 J. INST. FOR STUD. LEGAL
ETHIcs 269, 270 (1999). See generally Proceedings of the Conference on the
Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons: Professional and Ethical
Issues, supra note 3 (discussing how legal assistance is delivered to low income
individuals and considering how this might be better accomplished). But see
Marcia Coyle, Should Defendants Win Fees?, NAT'L L.J., Dec 20, 1999, at B2
(discussing the increase in successful business defendants in environmental suits
challenging the refusal by federal courts to award them attorney fees and costs);
David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modem American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM.
L. REv. 1908, 1945-46 (1999) (discussing such nay-sayers who describe
adjudication as "the ugly bureaucratic noise that grinds daily in [] Courts").
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). This is also seen in
the encouragement of suits, such as those seeking enforcement of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1999. See Dan Christensen & Michael D. Goldhaber,
Florida Businesses Face Storm of ADA Suits, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000, at A4
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fees payable by the government when it unreasonably opposes valid
claims;1 4 (4) Legal Aid and service associations, such as those in
New York City and Nassau and Suffolk Counties that provide legal
representation to the poor; 5 (5) class actions in civil rights and
civil liberties matters that have brought benefits to many;16 (6) a
discovery system that allows litigants to ferret out the truth; 17 (7)
(explaining that representatives of landlords complain about large fees earned by
lawyers who obtain minor benefits for their clients).
14 See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (providing that when there are "unreasonable" suits by government, "fees
and other expenses related to defending against the excessive demand" are
available); but see Security & Exch. Comm'n v. Price Waterhouse, 41 F.3d 805,
809 (2d Cir. 1994).
15 The bar now strongly supports legal aid service institutions. This was not
always the case. See Opposition to Nassau Legal Services for the Poor at
Meeting of Nassau County Lawyers Association, Nov. 29, 1965 (Unpublished
papers of Jack B. Weinstein 1964-1965). But see Jack B. Weinstein, Legal
Assistance to the Indigent in Nassau County, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8 and Dec. 9, 1965,
at 3; J. Bertram Wegman Challenges Weinstein's Statements on Validity of
Nassau Plan, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1965, at 3 (indicating that the Nassau County
Bar Association would follow statutory requirements in proposing "a plan to
provide counsel for those accused of a crime who could not afford to retain
counsel," and not confuse this plan with "a program of general legal assistance
in private, civil and administrative matters in the Office of Economic Opportuni-
ty in pursuance of its anti-poverty campaign"); Sylvia Law, Edward Sparer, The
Father of Poverty Law, AM. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 117 (pointing out that Sparer
developed the precursor of the Legal Services Corporation).
16 The desegregation cases furnish one example. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG,
RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 21 (1959) (inferring that a substantial
African-African involvement in the legal system is an important factor in
enforcing desegregation); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) (discussing
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund). Prisoner rights are another example. See
GREENBERG, supra, at 334-38, 396-97; Jonathan Ringel, Inmates Settle HIV
Dispute, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A4.
17 Several provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow litigants
to request information from opposing parties and witnesses. See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 30(a) (providing that a party may take the testimony of any person by
deposition upon oral examination); id. R. 33(a) (providing that a party may serve
upon any other party written interrogatories); id. R. 34(a) (providing that a party
may serve any other party a request to produce documents); id. R. 36(a)
(providing that a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission of the truth of certain matters). In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil
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an administrative law system designed to protect consumers;1 8 (8)
the pro bono contributions of lawyers, law firms and employees of
legal services groups 19 to those who seek succor in the law;2'
Procedure require parties to make initial disclosures without awaiting a discovery
request. id. R. 26(a).
'8 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1994)
(creating the Consumer Product Safety Commission to establish and enforce
product safety standards in order to protect the interest of the public); Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(establishing an administrative law system that regulates the development,
research, production and quality of food and drug products as defined under the
Act); Highway Safety Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 401-411 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)
(granting the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee the authority to
oversee a highway safety program designed to protect motorists from accidents,
injury, property damage and to oversee other areas of motorist safety);
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (creating an administrative law system dedicated to establishing basic
workplace safety standards in order to protect individual workers from hazardous
or injurious working conditions); Securities Exchanges Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78m (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (designating the Securities Exchange Commission
as a regulatory agency acting to protect investors and the general public from
misrepresentation and other harmful activity in the market).
19 See, e.g., Columbia Law School, Loan Repayment Assistance Program
(reducing burden of law school debt with the goal of making a career in public
service financially responsible for graduates). New York is even considering
allowing pro bono work to count towards attorneys' continuing legal education
(CLE) requirement. See John Caher, CLE-Pro Bono Plan Is Close to Approval,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9, 2000, at 1.
20 In particular, I note the efforts in the halls of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, which takes a leadership role. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
KATZMAN, THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (1995); Anthony Perez
Cassino, Public Service Versus Pro Bono, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1999, at 2 ("only
a fraction of the needs of the poor are being met"); William J. Dean, Weil
Gotshal & Manges Creates Pro Bono Externships, N.Y.L.J., Sept 3, 1999, at 3
(discussing impact of several large New York corporate firms creating pro-bono
programs); William J. Dean, West Coast Programs Provide Wide Range of
Services, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13, 2000, at 3 (discussing and describing the work of
the Volunteer Legal Services Program of the Bar Association of San Francisco
and Public Counsel, a public interest law firm in Southern California); William
W. Home, Making Pro Bono Pay, AM. LAW., July/August 1996, at S20 (noting
between 1994 and 1995, a 290% increase in private attorney pro bono hours at
a Florida law firm); Scott Medintz, Public Interest's Pitch Man, AM. LAW.,
July/Aug. 1996, at 48 (discussing the work of the Executive Director for the
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and (9) mediation and social work services provided to avoid
litigation strains.21
National Association for Public Interest Law in inducing persons to participate);
ProBonothon November 10, We Care Provides Matching Funds, 47 NASSAU
LAW. 1 (Oct. 1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono Can't Fill the Gap, NAT'L
L.J. Sept. 6, 1999, at A22 (noting that the American Bar Association has called
for additional "government funding for legal service lawyers"); Jerome J.
Shestack, Pro Bono and Public Interest Law, America Law Media, 100 Years
of Pennsylvania Law 54 (2000). The tradition is long standing. See George F.
Hritz & John B. Dawson, 200 Years Ago: Anti-Slavery Efforts by the New York
Bar, N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1999, at 2 (discussing the creation of the New York
Society for the Manumission of Slaves pioneered by John Jay and Alexander
Hamilton); Special Report on Pro Bono, AM. LAW. 38 (Dec. 1998).
21 The Federal Court for the Eastern District of New York has mediation,
pro se Clerk's advice, and social worker assistance through a closely connected
clinic at Brooklyn Law School. See also David E. Rovella, The Best Defense:
Rebuilding Clients' Lives to Keep Them from Coming Back, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31,
2000, at Al (discussing the "holistic advocacy" approach adopted by the Bronx
Defenders, an alternative to the Legal Aid Society's more traditional approach
to criminal defense); Yael Schacher, New Community Court Set to Open in
Brooklyn, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1999, at 1 (documenting the opening of a "multi-
jurisdictional community court and service center" in the Red Hook section of
Brooklyn, New York); Committee on Children and the Law and the Committee
on Family Court and Family Law, The Mediation Services Project, 54 REcORD
740 (1999); Jack B. Weinstein, When Is a Social Worker as Well as a Lawyer
Needed, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY OF LEGAL ETHics 391 (1999) (documenting the
practices of social workers and probation officers in the Eastern District of New
York with respect to criminal, civil, and social security matters). The County of
San Diego Department of the Public Defender and the courts cooperated in
bringing courts and social services together to assist the homeless. See Letter
from Steve Binder to Judge Jack B. Weinstein (Dec. 21, 1999) (on file with
author).
This idea was echoed in a recent New York Times editorial:
But these rights are not self-enforcing. Making them a reality
requires individuals with the skill and determination to use the law's
majestic machinery by bringing cases that expose the great gulf
between the high-mindedness of the Constitution and the injustices of
everyday life.
Thus it was that in the 1930's the legal arm of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People began plotting a
litigation strategy to force the courts to confront head-on the evils of
official racism. Propelled by Charles Houston, William Henry Hastie
and Thurgood Marshall, this effort eventually led to a momentous
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B. Failures
In any analysis of the failures of the adjudication system, we
must examine what happens in our prisons, for their occupants are
an important product of that system. Prisoners are, in a sense, the
wards of the lawyers and judges who placed them in custody. In
addition, problems arise because of (1) both miserly fees available
for capital defense attorneys and other inadequacies in capital
cases 22 that have helped lead to so many miscarriages of jus-
Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education, that finally
broke the back of official segregation. From Brown v. Board flowed
a robust civil rights movement and, in time, a giant wave of equal
rights legislation that even a Congress disproportionately influenced by
old-guard Southerners could not resist.
Thus it was, too, that in 1920 a visionary non-lawyer named
Roger Baldwin founded the American Civil Liberties Union, the first
permanent organization dedicated to vigorous defense of the Bill of
Rights, especially freedom of speech. One of the group's early actions
was to recruit Clarence Darrow to defend John Scopes, a young
Tennessee schoolteacher who dared defy that state's law against
teaching Darwin's theory of evolution. That famous case, a legal loss
but a public relations triumph, was a precursor to current fights over
the teaching of creationism in public school science classes-proof of
the old edict that civil liberties battles never stay won.
Inspired by the Supreme Court's new openness on civil rights,
A.C.L.U. attorneys set out to extend the reach of the Bill of Rights to
new groups and subject areas. This effort, since joined by other
organizations and other lawyers, has helped improve prison conditions,
reduce unnecessary government secrecy and achieve significant
advances for women's rights, children in foster care and the mentally
ill. In a similar spirit, public-interest law firms and conservation
groups, given new weapons by the landmark environmental statutes of
the late 1960's and early 1970's, have been instrumental in enforcing
those laws, often in the face of fierce resistance by the very govern-
ment agencies entrusted with carrying them out.
Editorial, Then/Now: Reflections on the Millennium, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1999,
at A18.
22 See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1257 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (blaming the lack of minimal standards and
adequate pay of appointed criminal defense lawyers for the inadequate
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tice;23 (2) parsimonious compensation of appointed counsel for
federal habeas corpus petitioners; 24 and (3) abuses of prisoners in
severely limiting court oversight, in reducing the opportunity of
prisoners for education, and in sending prisoners far away so that
their families cannot visit, thereby seriously compromising the
essential element of rehabilitation-connection to family-after
representation of criminal defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:
The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835, 1841-66 (1994) (examining closely the paucity of resources
available to, and the inexperience common among, court-appointed public
defenders); Gary Spencer, High Courts' 1998-99 Rulings Indicates Shift in
Direction, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1999, at 1 (stating that "in a highly controversial
administrative order, the Court [of Appeals] slashed compensation rates for
defense counsel in capital cases by as much as 50%, rejecting warnings from bar
leaders that the cut would make it difficult to attract qualified attorneys.
Governor Pataki had been demanding a reduction.").
23 See, e.g., David E. Rovella, Unclogging Gideon's Trumpet: Mississippi
Suits Are the Latest to Attack State Defense Funding, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000,
at 1 (discussing Mississippi's lack of a state-funded public defender system and
lawsuits brought by three Mississippi counties challenging this paucity); Elisabeth
Semel, The Lone Star State is Not Alone in Denying Due Process to Those Who
Face Execution, 23 CHAMPION 28, 29 (1999) (pointing out the need for
organized community defender programs and the inadequacies of legislative or
court created programs that provide only a token fee, cap expenses, and fail to
set standards); Ann Woolner, Invisible Bridge, AM. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 33
(discussing a meeting of judges and lawyers on ways to protect death sentence
defendants); Sara Rimer, Florida Legislature Deals with Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2000, at A22 (stating that "[s]ince 1974, 20 death row inmates have been
freed because of doubts about their guilt," and discussing a proposal to speed up
Florida's appeals process for its death row inmates); Jim Yardley, A Role Model
for Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, § 4, at 5 (discussing "inadequate legal
aid to poor defendants" on death row); Jim Yardley, Texas' Busy Death Chamber
Helps Define Bush's Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2000, at 1 (stating that "critics
describe the Texas system for capital crimes as the most unfair and merciless of
the 38 states with a death penalty, saying it deprives the accused of adequate
legal aid and appeals") (emphasis added).
2A See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (attorney fee cap provision); Larry
S. Pozner, Life, Liberty and Low-Bid Lawyers: The Defiling of Gideon, 23
CHAMPION 9 (July 1999); see also, e.g., Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.
1999) (temporal application of cap); The Week in Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9,
1999, at A7 (explaining that the Louisiana Supreme Court has limited law school
clinics' representation of the poor).
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release. The federal, state and local governments simply have not
supplied the money required for legal services and compensation
of attorneys to permit a balanced adjudicative system to operate
fairly.2 5
C. Ongoing Problems
The subtle problems of equalizing adjudicatory justice exist
even when the courts, attorneys and staff make a forceful attempt
to reduce the differences in adjudicative opportunities between the
poor and the rich. Attempts to equalize adjudicative justice and to
reduce differences based upon factors such as color, sex, socioeco-
nomic status, creed and national origin have raised similar
problems.
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, we have been immeasurably helped by a strong
Advisory Committee of the Bar for the Eastern District of New
York, under the chairmanship of Ed Weseley constantly reviewing
our practices and procedures. An Eastern District foundation,
headed by Professor George W. Johnson, assists financially and
otherwise. 6 For example, its funds help to compensate experts
and investigators in pro se cases. This foundation furnishes a social
25 Compare Judith S. Kaye, The State of the Judiciary 16-18 (2000) (calling
for increase in assigned counsel fees), with John Caher, Raise in Court Fines
Would Benefit Victims: Pataki Opposes Pay Raise for Assigned Counsel,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 2000, at 1, and Ruth Marcus, Public Defender Systems Tried
by Budget Problems, WASH. POST, March 8, 1992, at Al (detailing the vast
under-funding of the New Orleans public defender system). See also Michael A.
Riccardi, Second Lawsuit Challenges Rule 18-B Fee Structure, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22,
2000, at 1 (discussing a suit brought in New York challenging the state's
compensation of lawyers appointed to represent criminal defendants and family
court litigants); Michael A. Riccardi, Class Action Lawsuit Challenges 18-B Fee
Structure, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 2000, at 1 (discussing a class action suit brought by
court-appointed attorneys claiming that the fees they earn for this work is so low
so as to deny their criminal defendant clients adequate representation); Joan
Biskupic, Rehnquist's Year-End Report: Chief Justice Urgently Requests Higher
Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2000, at A2 (noting
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern that court-appointed counsel be adequately
compensated).
26 Eastern District Civil Litigation Foundation, Inc.
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worker operating out of Brooklyn Law School to help litigants who
might do better through social or administrative agencies than
through the courts. 2' The Eastern District Court's staff and court
services, such as the pro se clerks, pre-trial services, probation,
court-annexed arbitration and mediation services, and the public
defender are generally sensitive to the needs of the disadvantaged
and attempt to help them cope.
We need to recognize that even some in the middle class are
unable to take advantage of equal opportunity to access the courts
and administrative and other agencies. Combating this inability
requires vigilance and action inside the adjudicative process to
level the field in fact as well as in theory. In the immigration and
social security fields, the administrative judge has the explicit
obligation to seek out information that might assist the claimant.
By contrast, the court system assumes that an impartial and passive
judge presides and the adversaries seek to protect their own or their
client's interests. The judge must avoid some acts designed to
support the pro se or poorly represented claimant in order to
equalize presentations, even though the intervention was intended
to balance access to justice. Untilting the table might be viewed
with the suspicion that the judge is improperly favoring the poor
over the rich.28
27 See Weinstein, supra note 21, at 391.
28 Institutional protections are usually more protective than any intervention
by the judge. See the argument of Abe Fortas in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) quoted in Dan Levitt, Rhetoric-From Socrates to Court TV, LrTG.,
Fall 1999, at 42, 48-49:
This record does not indicate that the judge of the trial court... or
that the prosecuting attorney ... was derelict in his duty. . . . It
indicates that they tried to help Gideon. . . . But to me, if the Court
please, this record indicates the basic difficulty with Betts against
Brady [holding that appointment of defense counsel in a state criminal
case was not a federal constitutional right]. . . . And that the basic
difficulty with Betts against Brady is that no man, certainly no layman,
can conduct a trial in his own defense so that the trial is fair.
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II. MODELS FOR EQUALIZING THE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM
A number of models attempt to equalize justice. These models
vary significantly depending on the context. I will discuss several
approaches and the difficulties they face.
A. Mediation, Arbitration and Settlement
We have tried to deal with some of the problems of commercial
cases by mediation, court annexed arbitration and early settlement
conferences with our magistrate judges. I am not sure how well
that process works to meet a general societal problem where claims
of even $150,000 often cannot be pursued profitably because of the
high transaction costs in our complex civil litigation system. The
widespread private arbitration process has probably helped make
protection of commercial rights more viable. Analysis of the effect
of court-attached arbitration and mediation, or arbitration generally,
in its effect on various classes of litigants is needed.
For example, there is a class of disputes among neighbors and
within families that the States have attempted to resolve through
mediation.29 We must adjudicate these cases of the disaffected, of
which my court has seen a few, by trying to address them with a
resident social worker, pro se clerks, and pretrial and probation
officers. Too much interjection through "mediation" by the State,
as in China and Cuba, may be counter-productive from a democrat-
ic point of view. A certain amount of community and personal
disarray and litigiousness may be an irreducible concomitant of a
democratically robust social system. Even mediation without a
lawyer has its dangers. To that effect, the Eastern District has
29 In New York, for example, there is the Community Dispute Resolution
Center, providing financial support to non-profit community organizations in all
62 counties of the State without resort to formal court structures. See Community
Dispute Resolution Act, ch. 847, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 849a-g (McKinney 1981); see
also Report of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts for January 1, 1994
to December 31, 1994, at 12 (1995).
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before it a proposal by Peter Wooden to ask that members of our
pro bono panel advise pro se parties in mediation.3 °
B. Social Security Claims
Social security disability cases represent a good example of an
effective administrative system handling a huge docket while
protecting the rights of the poor. The process is, nevertheless,
frustrating to judges who review some of the decisions of adminis-
trative law judges. This is because many of those decisions are
predicated upon esoteric medical evaluations, making it difficult to
winnow out the shirkers and others who should not be receiving
government pensions. As a whole, however, the social security and,
particularly, the disability pension process reflect one of the great
successes of our legal system. The option of an appeal to the
court" adds necessary protections against unfairness without
excessive burdens. Nevertheless, the system has been manipulated
by government to cut costs by unlawfully depriving large classes
of deserving claimants of their benefits. A particularly egregious
example was the treatment of thousands of mentally ill some years
ago. 3
2
This disability review problem is difficult to deal with on the
basis of equality because it results from differences in social and
medical backgrounds of the claimants. Not only are the "well-to-
30 See Peter Woodin, Memorandum to the Board of Directors, Eastern
District Civil Litigation Fund, Nov. 16, 1999; see also Carol J. King, Burdening
Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 375, 379-381 (1999) (noting that in divorce cases dealing with child
custody and visitation issues, many courts have developed different approaches
to institutionalizing mediation by either establishing and funding court-annexed
mediation programs, staffed by court employees, or by educating divorcing
parents through brochures or video tapes and then directing those parents to
private mediators).
31 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994).
32 See City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (E.D.N.Y.),
afftd, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub. nom. Bowen v. City of New York,
476 U.S. 467 (1986); Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security
Disability Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE. L. REv. 897, 902 (1984);
see also LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE 137-39 (1999).
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do" persons more capable of dealing with the system and obtaining
counsel, they also often will have had a long-term family physician
supervising specialists. Low income people, by contrast, are often
served-when they get medical treatment at all-in clinics, where
they are sent from one doctor to another, making a sensible
integrated presentation to the administrative law judge almost
impossible, even though the administrative judge is charged with
seeking out medical records. The disadvantaged often have little
cogent written medical history available. Sometimes, in social
security cases, in addition to appointing counsel from a pro bono
panel on a remand, courts will authorize payment for a physician
from funds of the Eastern District Foundation.33
Differences between effective adjudication for the more and
less affluent may be affected by the new developing medical
delivery systems, where the middle class also often will lack a
single family doctor and full specialists and testing. But, it is a
dubious boon to equality when disparities of injustice between rich
and poor are balanced by a reduction of the opportunity for the
relatively affluent to access the justice system, rather than by an
increase in effective representation for the poor. Levelling should
go up, not down.
How much we can and should add to a compulsory process of
litigating disputes about the new breed of Health Management
Organizations' ("HMO") denials of service and Medicare and
Medicaid payments is not clear. Because many of those aggrieved
by HMO decisions are articulate middle-class people capable of
making their voices heard, the legislatures are beginning to provide
effective remedies for all.34 These are, for many millions, among
33 See supra text accompanying note 26 (explaining that the Eastern District
Civil Litigation Foundation provides services to poor people).
4 See, e.g., Patients Bill of Rights of 1999, S. 1256, 106th Cong. (1999)
(providing, inter alia, HMO members the ability to challenge an HMO's denial
of coverage); see also Rene H. Reixach, Jr., Medicaid and Medicare Fair
Hearings Are Vital First Step in Reversing Adverse Decisions on Patient Care,
N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N J., Feb. 2000, at 8 (explaining the crucial role of the fair
hearing process under Medicare, specifically its administrative, authoritative and
judicial implications for Medicare recipients).
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the most critical of their grievances over what they consider to be
a denial of substantive rights.
I am dubious about how fairly the out-of-court adjudications of
medical reimbursements are conducted. Some years ago when I
forced a change in the "gobbledegook" notices to claimants of a
right to appeal,35 I received the impression that many aggrieved
claimants did not understand and could not protect their rights. Yet,
individual appeals to the courts in millions of such cases might
overwhelm us unless an effective administrative or mediation
screening system were developed.
C. Mass Torts and Other Delicts
It is in mass torts that we most often see the need to temper the
individual's right to full civil adjudication using the entire panoply
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.36 In cases involving small
claims by many, class actions are the most effective way of
litigating even though individual suits, if they were affordable,
might best protect the substantive interests of the plaintiffs and the
defendants.
In addition, civil and criminal litigations may be melded in
some cases in order to best protect individual plaintiffs while
conserving resources. This model, based on the French system,
provides the equivalent of a class action through restitution
supervised by the United States Attorney.37 This combination was
31 See David v. Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1033, 1035-1045 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(holding that the existing mechanism for notifying Medicare patients of a denial
of coverage was a system rife with "bureaucratic gobbledegook, jargon, double
talk, a form of officialise, federalese and insurancese, and doublespeak"); see
also Benjamin Weiser, Judge Orders Fast Review of Claims for Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at All ("Nearly eight years after the Social Security
Administration agreed to review the cases of thousands of New Yorkers who
were wrongfully denied disability benefits during the Reagan Administration, a
federal judge in Manhattan has criticized the agency for moving too slowly,
saying people are dying before their claims can be processed.").
36 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
125 (1995).
" See United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 223 (E.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118
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successfully accomplished in one jointly conducted criminal
proceeding and class action based on frauds committed on a large
group of Chinese immigrants.38
The administrative model provides another alternative for
dealing with mass torts. Preliminary studies of this model, such as
the study provided by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986, 39 however, suggest that it may be quicker and fairer than
expensive court adjudication with high transactional costs. In non-
criminal securities cases, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's fines and administratively ordered restitution would seem to
be a more reasonable way to deal with securities delicts if the
Commission had the personnel to police more fully.
Perhaps consumer protection agencies charged with the safety
of automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and other consumer products
should deal with damages arising from the inadequacy of some of
these products. This is because an administrative decision declaring
general liability for defects may be possible. Individual suits or
administrative proceedings for later determination of liability to
individual claimants may be developed.' Fines may be used in
place of massive punitive damages and held by the government for
distribution to claimants.
In repetitive stress injury litigation in the Eastern District of
New York, some improvements in worker protection were obtained
through deterrence attendant on the tort litigation.4' Yet, poor
S. Ct. 1582 (1998); United States v. Cheung, 952 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
38 See Cheung, 952 F. Supp. at 148; see also Jonathan Lippman, New
Approach Put to the Test, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at 1 (discussing possibility of
fusing criminal, family, and housing proceedings).
39 Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified throughout 42 U.S.C. § 300a(a)
(1994)).
40 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Bromme, An Examination of the Refund Remedy
Under the CPSA and the FHSA, 28 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP., Jan. 10, 2000,
at 25 (describing the refund remedy process involved when a company recalls
a dangerous consumer product pursuant to the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2064(d) (1994)).
" See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litigation, 11 F.3d 368, 374 (2d Cir.
1993), reh'g granted, 35 F.3d 637 (2d Cir. 1994); Robert Pear, After Long
Delay, U.S. Plans to Issue Ergomatic Rules, Effort to Limit Injuries, N.Y. TIMES,
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workers across the country gained more through the regulations of
OSHA. If the government were serious about funding administra-
tive agencies for enforcement, there would be a greater chance for
equality in the adjudicatory system. The appellate courts have not
been sufficiently responsive to the needs of claimants and defen-
dants when they restrict class action suits and settlements in cases
such as those involving asbestos or HIV-tainted blood.42 Where
massive wrongs have taken place, one-on-one litigations lead to
huge transactional costs, delays, and the denial of rights.
Obviously, there is a balance to be drawn between unjust
coercion of defendants on the one hand, and denial of effective
rights on the other. But, I am not sure that in insisting on the
highest standards of control by the litigant in individual cases, we
do not underserve society and the majority of claimants. Since
World War II, we have persisted in trying to create substantive and
procedural rules available equally to all within our country, rich
and poor, powerful and powerless. In tort lawsuits, attempts to
make the law available to those harmed by massive delicts, while
protecting industry and technological change, seems to be in the
process of being compromised by legislative caps, disentitlements,
and the discouragement of settlements.
There is an increasing aversion on the part of appellate courts
to aggregation of cases through class actions and other means.43
In many instances this has lead to frustration on the part of both
plaintiffs and defendants, who, together, seek by class action
settlements to avoid large scale human distress, huge transactional
costs, delays, the multiplication of suits across many jurisdictions,
and difficulties in planning industrial and commercial activity
Nov. 22, 1999, at Al; Robert Pear, Business and Labor Differ in Ergonomic
Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1999, at A20.
42 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (reversing a
Fifth Circuit affirmance of a certification of a mandatory settlement class in an
asbestos suit); In re Rhone-Poulene Rorace, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995)
(reversing the federal district court's class certification of a group of hemophili-
acs infected by the AIDS virus).
" See supra note 42 and accompanying text (showing the Court's aversion
to certifying class actions for purposes of adjudicating torts suffered by those
exposed to asbestos and HIV-infection).
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because of a cloud of overhanging litigation. Given the sensible
control of cases and fees by judges, abuses may be minimized and
the advantages of consolidation may outweigh the disadvantages.
We have the judicial tools to provide some degree of individual
justice in mass litigations." Certainly, we must be particularly
vigilant of, and sensitive to, the ethical issues of representation and
due process, where many people's complaints are considered in one
case. For example, I would not criticize the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals' refusal-approved by the Supreme Court-to countenance
one massive settlement in the asbestos litigation.45 That case
raised difficult problems of ethics and adequate representation of
future claimants and other subclasses. In other cases, however, an
aversion to class actions has led to unjustified decertifications or
dismissals. Ethics and due process may be given appropriate weight
when courts handle mass disaster settlements effectively. 46 I have
tried, and helped settle, many mass tort cases-Agent Orange,
asbestos, DES, breast implants and others.47 Based on these
experiences, I have concluded that class action settlements are not
subversive of due process. They can serve all the people of the
Nation well.
The most difficult intellectual and political problems raised by
class action cases relate to federalism. The question that arises is
whether it is possible to integrate the work of federal and state
courts when a litigation, such as asbestos or tobacco, spreads
through hundreds of courts and dozens of jurisdictions. We may
ask whether one state or federal court should control a national or
4 See, e.g., Judges, Not Legislators, Hold Key to Reform of Class Actions,
Rand Reports, 68 U.S.L.W. 2279, at 2279 (Nov. 16, 1999) (promoting the view
that judges, through settlement approval and fee awards, control the outcome of
class actions, and the effect on class members and society using these tools
effectively will create positive change in class action litigation).
" See Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996),
affd sub nom. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
'6 See, e.g., Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 746
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 818 F. 2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); In re DES Cases, 789 F.
Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958,
959 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig.,
129 B.R. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
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world-wide dispute by settlement, class action or another technique
with respect to these varied and widespread laws, claims and
defenses.
In many instances it would be better if the legislature dealt with
these matters. A modified bankruptcy procedure could provide a
useful model if an effective voting procedure by informed litigants
could be developed. Our economy operates on a national and
international scale. The law of the simple automobile fender-bender
requires modification if it is to accomplish effective justice for all
parts of our society in global cases arising in our modern techno-
logical, economic, and social worlds. There are festering sores on
the public and private psyches left by disasters, such as DES,
thalidomide, Agent Orange, asbestos, and HIV-tainted blood that
the law cannot ignore.
Increasingly, in our integrated global electronic communication
society, we find the poor of the world using our almost unique
procedures for class actions and our court system to meet world-
wide tort and other problems of the oppressed from other lands.
Already, we have entertained actions against foreign tyrants from
the Philippines48 to Paraguay49 by slave laborers and by those
cheated and abused during, and following, the Nazis' regime
against banks and large corporations." Expanded views of
personal jurisdiction may now be utilized by the courts to expand
litigations. Ultimately, treaties may be required to control such
litigation.5'
What is particularly important is to try to assuage the fear and
concern of plaintiffs. In the Agent Orange cases, I traveled the
nation to hear the stories of fearful veterans and their wives, who
" See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp 1460, 1469 (D. Haw. 1995),
aff'd, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
'9 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pona-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980).
50 See, e.g., In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d
164, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 96 Civ.
4849 (E.D.N.Y.).
"' See Simon v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000);
Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational
World Communicating by Satellites, 37 WILLAMErrE L. REv. (forthcoming 2000)
(speech to AALS section on conflicts of law, Jan. 8, 2000).
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were terrorized by visions of genetic damage that had no scientific
basis. Just listening and, then, providing a national network of
person-to-person assistance helped. In the DES non-class action
cases, massive settlements with a set of matrixes, the help of a
special master, and informal conferences in chambers between the
shaken women and the trial judge after settlement acted as a useful
catharsis that money alone would not provide. So, too, in the breast
implant cases settled by the thousands in the federal district courts
of the Eastern District of New York, a sympathetic special master
meeting with the women was useful as a balm and an explanation
of what was happening.5 2 In the trials themselves, the court could
not show sympathy or act less than impartially towards each
side.53
In many of these mass tort matters the media and lawyers stir
up unnecessary fears of the credulous. The courts, using science
and some sympathy, with the aid of counsel and special masters,
may provide the appropriate reassurance. So, too, may defendants
and their counsel provide reassurance through apology and
guarantees of help when it proves necessary.
D. Discrimination Cases
The federal district court for the Eastern District of New York
has had an enormous influx of civil rights, sex, race, age and
disability discrimination claims. Unlike the Social Security
Administration and the machinery it has employed, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") sometimes has
not sufficiently addressed the administrative tasks of screening and
providing out-of-court resolutions for many of its disputes.' Too
52 See, e.g., Morton Denlow, Justice Should Emphasize People, Not Paper,
83 JUDICATURE 50, 50 (1999) (stating that "[m]ore face-to-face contact among
clients, lawyers and judges will improve satisfaction with the court system").
13 See Deuteronomy 16:19 (providing that "[y]ou shall not pervert judgment,
you shall not respect someone's presence"). Rashi's gloss on the phrase is that
the court must treat everyone equally and "[i]f a judge shows more respect to
one litigant the other feels at a disadvantage."
' See, e.g., Sudha Setty, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the Office
for Civil Rights to Achieve Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
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many controversies are thrown raw and undigested into the courts
where they linger and become more intractable. In the context of
discrimination cases, Congress has provided for legal fees for the
prevailing plaintiff,55 making cases with any merit attractive to
lawyers. Consequently, many cases are well tried, but they are
expensive.
Many discrimination cases are brought pro se. The fact that
there is no lawyer often suggests that these cases are not worth
trying. But, frequently there is enough merit to the allegations to
prevent summary judgment, especially when the plaintiffs feel
wronged. This subset of cases needs reconsideration if we are to
screen out those disputes driven by psychological, rather than legal
problems. Often the claim was sparked by an imperious manage-
ment style, rather than discrimination. We may ask whether an
apology or mediation will help before the case has become frozen
in vindictiveness. Both sides are frustrated by a failure to obtain a
reasonable early resolution, and so are we in the court.
E. Habeas Corpus and Prisoner Abuse Cases
A similar kind of difficulty with cases of little or no merit is
presented by many prisoner habeas corpus and civil rights actions
charging abuse by the police or others. Barrier after barrier is
placed before the pro se litigant in his cell in prison.56 The
prisoner is considered less than human and entitled to be abused to
some point.
PROBS. 331, 340 (1999) (discussing the EEOC's failure to effectively inspect
discrimination complaints, develop compliance plans and monitor such plans).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (providing that "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs").
56 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY
MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S
PRISONS 382 (1998) (noting the barriers caused by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996 that require an individual to prove that conditions, such as
overcrowding, violate his constitutional rights before the federal courts may order
changes); Prison Litigation Reform Act's Cap on Legal Fees, 68 U.S.L.W. 3128
(Aug. 24, 1999).
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For habeas corpus proceedings and other cases, the amount the
appointed attorney is paid is so small as to induce, in some
instances, inadequate attention by the lawyer." In many of the
prisoner civil rights cases, as in the discrimination cases, I am
reluctant to appoint an attorney because the costs of full blown
discovery seem unwarranted. In one case, a well-respected attorney
caused the defendant to spend $100,000 in discovery costs, which
the defense counsel wanted to collect on the ground that the suit
was frivolous. I denied the motion, but it made me somewhat leery
of full-fledged adjudications in every case started pro se in the
federal courts. Rule 11 sanctions are futile.
Is there some systemic way of dealing with the problem? A
"sitting brief," where an experienced trial counsel would sit
alongside the pro se litigant during the trial, might help. The
attorney would advise the litigant at trial. But, many lawyers would
be uncomfortable with such a role when discovery and trial
preparation were inadequate. These cases sharply etch the dilemma
of the advantaged and the disadvantaged seeking equal justice.
Retaining counsel with your own money arguably does provide
some assurance of the adequacy of the claim or defense.
E Sentencing
There is a superb group of legal aid attorneys attached to the
Eastern District of New York. Yet, they, and many private
attorneys, fail to do an adequate job on sentencing. In deciding on
rehabilitation, for example, the rich child given every advantage of
psychiatric and other expertise can usually make a better case for
rehabilitation than the poor person who will be thrown back into
the same environment, beset by the same pressures that led to the
original crime.58
" See, e.g., David Rohde, Critical Shortage of Lawyers for Poor Seen, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1999, at 59 (chronicling how the low fees resulting in adequate
attention cause the criminal and family court cases of the indigent to languish).
58 The drug courts, fought for by Chief Judge Kaye and others, can do a
much better job in directing defendants to early drug treatment rather than to jail,
while they still can be saved. See, e.g., Peggy Fulton Hora & William G. Schma,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: As Demonstrated by Drug Courts, Judges Can
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Should the defendant be granted a year free of restraint before
sentence, with psychiatric assistance, job training and other services
to demonstrate rehabilitation? More and more I want to turn to this
technique. It seems entirely appropriate to authorize the use of
government funds for specialists, such as social workers, doctors
or tutors to help "treat" the poorest of defendants during a year's
wait before sentencing. Assistance with schooling or a job is often
required. The defendant can be released on closely supervised bail
in contemplation of a possible strict probation term or dismissal
instead of prison.5 9
The calculus of equalization, taking into account differences in
past opportunities and the rigidities of the guidelines-sometimes
racist in their impact, as in the diverse sentencing treatment of
crack and cocaine-is difficult to assess and deal with. Yet, I think
we can do better in providing minimum assurances that poor
people are not unnecessarily sent to prison.
G. Empathy, the Most Powerful Solvent
Trial judges, as front-line representatives of the law, the human
face of the law, cannot blink away the baleful effects in our
criminal and civil litigations of sharp and growing socioeconomic
differences. Looking out from the cave of the courts to perceive
dimly the enormous diversity of life that is only opaquely revealed
in the courtroom, many judges are dismayed at the social inequali-
ties that we must seek to deal with in our system of adjudicative
justice. The challenge to the judge becomes how we can most
effectively minimize the inequalities while providing an acceptable
minimum standard for all the people in all kinds of situations. This
challenge remains.
The most powerful weapon we have is empathy. The leavening
influence of regard for our fellow human beings and concern for
Improve the Psychological Well Being of People Subject to the Legal Process
and, in Turn, Make Their Own Jobs More Rewarding, 82 JUDICATURE 9, 11-12
(1998) (explaining how the drug courts' therapeutic approach promotes a respect
for the law and for the humanity of the criminal defendant).
'9 See, e.g., United States v. Blake, No. CR 98-979, 2000 WL 286685
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000).
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their welfare does more than any practice, procedure, rule or statute
to ensure equality in the courts and our administrative agencies.
Nisi prius, as well as other judges, can become hardened by too
much exposure to tragedy. Few of us find the time or interest to
volunteer and help people in our deprived communities and, thus,
get to know how they live. We must try to bridge the gap between
them and us. We must try to open communication between the
heart of the law and the hearts of those who seek justice from us.
This goal requires not only that we act justly on a moral plane, but
also that we make our reasoning understandable and, so far as
practicable, acceptable to every level of society.
Leading appellate judges have described the appellate functions
as performed almost entirely through research and cogitation. Such
a description is not useful for trial lawyers and district judges who
observe and deal with real people who are sometimes irrational, but
always unique, interesting and important. Often what they want
most is a hearing to demonstrate that we understand their fears and
their sense of mortality. The need for sensitivity to people is just
as true for lawyers in their offices as it is for judges in their
courtrooms.
One of the reasons for avoiding excessive sentences is that the
empathy required of lawyers-and of citizens in a democracy-is
stunted when parents are away in prison. "[W]ithout regular
comforting, physical contact and sensory stimulation from birth, the
biological capacity for sociality-the precondition for empathy and
conscience-cannot develop ... and [e]mpathy requires the
nurturing required by early social relationships." 6 Breaking up
60 Phillips Stevens, Jr. and William Damon, Molding Morality, Sci. AM.,
Dec. 1999, at 14. Peter Berkowitz has similarly recognized the important role the
family plays in socialization:
It is in the family that the child first develops the capacity for love and
trust... [and s]ubsequently, the rich array of voluntary or secondary
associations that flourish in a well-ordered society foster the 'coopera-
tive virtues,' which include 'justice and fairness, fidelity and trust,
integrity and impartiality' ... [and flinally, through fulfilling the
offices of citizenship, individuals develop an allegiance to the
principles of justice such that they learn to treat fellow citizens as the
free and equal beings they are.
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families by sending fathers and mothers to prison for unnecessarily
long terms sows the seeds of problems for the next generation,61
particularly when, as is sometimes the case, the ex-prisoner
becomes a "monster.,
62
CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW CENTURY
At the beginning of this new century, enormous demographic
and socioeconomic changes are taking place. These changes will
further strain the American resources of fraternity that have carried
us through so many crises. Accessibility to the courts and other
adjudicatory institutions on roughly equal terms is essential to
equality before the law. If we cannot provide this foundation of
protection through the courts, many of the rest of our promises of
liberty and justice for all remain a mockery for the poor and the
oppressed. Equal access to the judicial process is a sign of a just
society. While we have made enormous strides towards that goal,
it is still a glaring truth that equality is, in the real world, often a
figment of the jurisprudential imagination.
Achieving full and precise equality, even in the courts, is
incredibly difficult in a society where there is so much social and
economic inequality. There must be more aid to Legal Services and
pro bono enterprises to begin a semblance of a balance of legal
resources available to rich and poor. So, too, is insistence on
adequately-funded government-supported legal services for the
poor-without artificial government imposed limitations. The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and others, as well
as so many individual lawyers, have struggled mightily to provide
pro bono help and to fund Legal Services and Legal Aid against
PETER BERKOWTrz, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 25
(1999) (quoting JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 462-72 (1971)).
61 But see Malcolm Gladwell, Baby Steps: Do Our First Three Years of Life
Determine How We'll Turn Out?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2000, at 80 (conclud-
ing that even children deprived in early years can catch up with adequate later
help--at least in many cases).
62 See, e.g., Michael Berryhill, Prisoner's Dilemma, Did the Texas Penal
System Kill James Byrd?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 27, 1999, at 18 (discussing the
influence of prison on the brutal dragging death of James Byrd).
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those who would protect their privileges by denying the rights of
others. We must continue to try to accomplish the attainable, even
if nearly impossible: procedural and substantive fairness and the
integration of mercy and justice for the people,63 all the people we
lawyers and judges are charged with protecting under the Rule of
Law.64 That is the glorious public service to which we are called.
As we enter a new Millennium, we can look back 2000 years
with profit when the contemporaries Hillel (60 B.C.E. to 20 C.E.)
and Jesus (5 B.C.E. to 30 C.E.) laid down the central rule that
should still inform our work: "Do unto others as you would have
them do unto you. ' 65 Lawyers cannot long keep the ethical level
63 See Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1
(1987), in THE RESPONSIBLE JUDGE, READINGS IN JuDIcIAL ETHIcs 148 (John
T. Noonan, Jr. and Kenneth I. Winston eds., 1993).
64 See Judge Fuld's remarks on his departure from the Court of Appeals,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1973, at 1:
The courts must insure that the ideal of equal protection under law
shall be more than a hallowed phrase; that the disadvantaged shall not
be denied their rights because of lack of adequate representation; and
that the aid and protection of the courts shall ever be available on
equal terms to one and all, to the poor, the weak and the unpopular as
well as to the rich, the strong and the popular, to the nonconformist as
well as to the conformist, and to the bigot as well as to the victim of
prejudice. In short, in adjusting the machinery of the court system to
achieve greater efficiency of operation, the courts must see to it that
the quality of adjudication is not sacrificed to speed of disposition.
See also Berkowitz, supra note 60, at 23 (discussing communitarian view that
"a well-ordered society and a good life depend upon the exercise of virtue, the
practice of citizenship, and participation in a common political life").
65 See, e.g., JAMES H. CHARLESWORTH & LOREN L. JOHNS, HILLEL AND
JESUS: COMPANIONS OF TWO MAJOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS 19-20 (1997)
(explaining that both prophets summarized the Torah which is a part of universal
human learning). The Rule assumes some kind of normality and kindness
towards self. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Early Sex Abuse Hinders Many Women
on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at I (establishing a link between sex
abuse and welfare, since victims of abuse tend to be addicts, suffer from
disabilities, depression, or other social, physical and emotional obstacles).
Professor George P. Fletcher in his essay, In God's Image: The Religious
Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1608, 1615-17 (1999),
makes an interesting argument based on language in Genesis 2:18-23. While
religious sentiment certainly now permeates our American Society and was
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required by equal adjudicative justice appreciably higher than that
reflected in our social ethos revealed in substantive rights for the
poor; and the social-ethical level cannot long be kept artificially
higher than most individual's view of what is good and just in
treatment of the less fortunate. In a larger sense, then, if we would
satisfy our adjudicate duties, we must also satisfy our social and
individual obligations to the poor as members of the whole
community.
In our complex, tripartite free-enterprise welfare-philanthropic
system, no single formula can serve the poor in all their different
guises and roles. The lawyer's role to improve the lives and
protections of all of us is central.
present at the creation of our Constitution, our courts are secular and must
depend on the more secular (though religiously influenced). "All ... are Created
Equal" in the Declaration of Independence, and elsewhere in our history. Id. In
view of the divisiveness of religions and the tendency of adherents to want to
dominate or proselytize others, the First Amendment rather than the story of
creation seems a better guarantor of equality in our civil society.
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